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We are today engaged in a vigorous national debate about who is an 
“employee.”  The popular media regularly report on the employee status of “gig” 
economy workers, such as Uber and Lyft drivers.1  The companies shaping the 
                                                 
 + Edward A. Zelinsky is the Morris and Annie Trachman Professor of Law at the Benjamin N. 
Cardozo School of Law of Yeshiva University.  For comments on prior drafts of this Article, he 
thanks Professors Daniel Hemel and David J. Weisenfeld as well as the participants in the Cardozo 
faculty seminar.  For student research assistance, Prof. Zelinsky thanks Gabrielle Kraushaar, 
Bradley Haymes, and Anna Antonova. 
 1. See, e.g., Daniel Wiessner, Uber Drivers are Contractors, not Employees, U.S. Labor 
Agency Says, REUTERS (May 14, 2019, 4:04 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uber-
contractors/uber-drivers-are-contractors-not-employees-us-labor-agency-says-idUSKCN1SK2FY 
(discussing opinion of NLRB general counsel that Uber drivers are independent contractors, not 
employees). 
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gig economy insist that the individuals affiliated with their service platforms are 
independent contractors.2  Some—though not all3—of the advocates for these 
workers counter that these workers are, or should be treated as, employees.4  As 
employees, these individuals receive the protection of federal and state statutes 
regulating the terms and conditions of employment. 
Parallel to, and overlapping with, this popular discussion is a body of 
scholarship largely critical of the current legal definition of employee status.5  
Current law, many critics maintain, is unclear, unprincipled, and overly 
complex.  Other critics emphasize that denying employee status to workers 
improperly deprives them of the coverage of state and federal laws, such as 
minimum wage statutes, workers compensation laws, and unemployment 
insurance legislation. 
The enactment into law of California Assembly Bill 5, commonly referred to 
as “A.B.5,” is an important event in this debate.6  My assessment of A.B.5 differs 
                                                 
 2. Id. (“San Francisco-based Uber in a statement said it is ‘focused on improving the quality 
and security of independent work, while preserving the flexibility drivers and couriers tell us they 
value.’”).  See also Complaint at 2, Olson v. California, No. 2:19-cv-10956 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 30, 
2019) [hereinafter Olson Complaint] (commenting that Uber drivers are “independent service 
providers [who] have enjoyed opportunities to earn money when and where they want, with 
unprecedented independence and flexibility”). 
 3. See, e.g., Shirin Ghaffary & Alexia F. Campbell, A Landmark Law Disrupted the Gig 
Economy in California.  But What Comes Next for Uber Drivers?, VOX: RECODE (Oct. 4, 2019, 
2:30 PM), https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/10/4/20898940/uber-lyft-drivers-ab5-law-
california-minimum-wage-benefits-gig-economy-disrupted (“But so far, drivers’ working 
conditions haven’t improved.  Although many were excited about AB 5’s passing, dozens say 
they’re anxious about what’s ahead, and they shared concerns about losing flexibility and continued 
issues over pay in online driver groups and interviews with Recode. . . .  Many drivers are worried 
that because of AB 5, Uber and Lyft will limit workers’ flexibility.”); Gabrielle Canon, California’s 
Controversial Labor Bill Has Passed the Senate.  Experts Forecast More Worker Rights, Higher 
Prices for Services, USA TODAY (Sept. 13, 2019, 5:43 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/09/10/what-californias-ab-5-means-apps-
like-uber-lyft/2278936001/ (“Drivers against the legislation have raised concerns about whether 
the workforce will be cut, as the companies face higher costs to come into compliance.”); Kate 
Conger & Noam Scheiber, California Bill Makes App-Based Companies Treat Workers as 
Employees, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/11/technology/ 
california-gig-economy-bill.html (“The bill was not universally supported by drivers.  Some 
opposed it because they worried it would make it hard to keep a flexible schedule.”). 
 4. See, e.g., The Am. Fed’n of Lab. and Cong. of Indus. Orgs., AFL-CIO Asserts that Gig 
Economy Workers Are Employees (Mar. 1, 2016), https://aflcio.org/press/releases/afl-cio-asserts-
gig-economy-workers-are-employees. 
 5. See infra Section II. 
 6. See, e.g., Gabrielle Canon, California’s Lorena Gonzalez: AB 5 Champion and ‘Black 
Widow of Public Policy,’ USA TODAY (Oct. 4, 2019, 12:33 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/10/04/lorena-gonzalez-ab-5-champion-black-
widow-of-public-policy/2423465001/; Tony Marks, How Do You Spell Trouble? California AB5, 
FORBES (Sept. 11, 2019, 11:52 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tonymarks/2019/09/11/how-do-
you-spell-trouble-california-ab-5/#42ae7fed7e29; Megan R. Dickey, Gig Worker Bill, AB-5, 
Passes California State Senate, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 11, 2019, 1:34 AM), 
https://techcrunch.com/2019/09/10/gig-worker-bill-ab-5- passes-in-California/. 
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from the evaluation advanced by the advocates and opponents of this legislation: 
I conclude that A.B.5 made a significant but limited expansion of the coverage 
of California labor law, but at a notable cost.  Even as A.B.5 broadened the reach 
of the Golden State’s labor protections, A.B.5 also made the definition of 
“employee” more complex and less uniform.  Those seeking federal or state 
legislation like A.B.5 confront the same trade-off under which greater coverage 
is achieved at the expense of more complexity and less uniformity in the 
definition of who is an employee.  The same political forces and policy 
considerations that molded A.B.5 in California will have similar effects in other 
states and in the halls of Congress. 
Those who advocate expanding the coverage of laws protecting workers 
herald A.B.5 as the dawn of a new day.7  By codifying the “ABC” test for 
employment status, these advocates contend that A.B.5 properly extends legal 
protections to the workers of the modern economy.  In contrast, opponents of 
A.B.5 argue that it will cripple important sectors of the U.S. economy.8 
A review of A.B.5 and the background from which it emerged leads to a more 
nuanced story than either of these simple narratives.  For those who assert that 
current law is uncertain and too complex, A.B.5 makes matters worse.  A.B.5 is 
replete with exceptions, exemptions, and interpretive challenges, which make 
the law of employee status even more complicated and more unclear than it was 
before.  For those who seek expanded employment-based protection for workers 
in the modern economy, the myriad exceptions and exemptions of A.B.5 are a 
sober warning of the practical and political realities standing in the way of such 
expansion.  For those defending the status quo, A.B.5 is an equally sober 
warning of considerable dissatisfaction with this status quo. 
A.B.5 is thus an important data point, which indicates that those who seek to 
reform the law of employee status face a trade-off: efforts to expand the coverage 
of employment-based protection laws will make the law more complex and less 
uniform—as did A.B.5.  Given the relevant political forces and policy 
considerations, legislators can broaden the reach of employment-based 
regulatory laws to cover more workers in the modern economy, or they can 
simplify and unify the legal definition of employee status.  They cannot do both. 
The first section of this Article outlines the legal background against which 
A.B.5 was adopted.  Whether an individual is an employee or an independent 
                                                 
 7. See, e.g., Conger & Scheiber, supra note 3 (“Ride-hailing drivers hailed the bill’s 
passage.”). 
 8. See id. (“Uber and Lyft have repeatedly warned that they will have to start scheduling 
drivers in advance if they are employees, reducing drivers’ ability to work when and where they 
want. . . .  That could lead to a reduced need for drivers over all.”); see also Olson Complaint, supra 
note 2, at 7 (stating that the goal of the A.B.5 sponsors “is to deprive workers of the flexibility and 
freedom of their current independent status”); Ghaffary & Campbell, supra note 3 (“Uber and Lyft 
have responded that more expensive and restrictive labor standards would force them to make these 
kinds of changes [such as requiring drivers to schedule shifts] to effectively run their businesses.”); 
Canon, supra note 6 (quoting Ryan Vet as saying that A.B.5 will “implode the gig economy as we 
know it today”); Marks, supra note 6 (“This is a potential neutron bomb under AB-5.”). 
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contractor plays critical, though different, roles in various areas of the law.  In 
this first section, I explore and contrast these roles in three important legal 
arenas: taxes, torts, and regulatory protection.  As part of this discussion, I 
identify the law’s four basic definitions of employee status: the common law 
control test; the increasingly popular ABC test, which was incorporated into 
A.B.5; the standard of “economic realities”; and the concept of statutory 
purpose. 
The second section of this Article explores the legal literature in this area.  
Central to this literature are the critiques of the current law of employee status 
as too complicated, too opaque, and too limited.  Against this background, the 
third section describes A.B.5 as enacted into law.  Central to A.B.5 are the many 
exemptions and exceptions embodied in this statute and the interpretive 
challenges raised by those exemptions and exceptions as well as by the ABC test 
itself. 
The third section of this Article evaluates A.B.5 in light of the background 
against which A.B.5 was adopted.  A.B.5 is neither the panacea some of its 
advocates maintain nor the tragedy its opponents bemoan.  This section 
emphasizes four features of A.B.5, which cumulatively make the law of 
employee status even more complex and less uniform than it was before.  First, 
A.B.5 incorporates the ABC test, which has its interpretative challenges.  These 
ambiguities include the “control” standard,9 which the ABC inquiry borrows 
from the common law, as well as such contestable notions as whether a worker 
is “customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, or 
business”10 and “the usual course of the hiring entity’s business.”11 
Second, A.B.5 is replete with exemptions and exceptions, the boundaries of 
which are often opaque.  Third, the drafters of A.B.5 made the unfortunate 
choice of incorporating by reference an important decision of the California 
Supreme Court—S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial 
Relations—rather than stating in explicit statutory terms the rule the drafters 
believe Borello embodies.12  Fourth, A.B.5 has no impact on an individual’s 
status as an employee for tort purposes and has an inconsistent impact on an 
individual’s status as an employee for state income tax purposes.  It is thus 
possible, for example, for an individual to be deemed to be an employee under 
A.B.5 for purposes of the Golden State’s employment-based protection laws 
while remaining an independent contractor for the tort rule of respondeat 
superior. 
                                                 
 9. Cal. Assemb. B. 5 § 2, 2019–20 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (adding § 2750.3(a)(1)(A) to 
the California Labor Code). 
 10. Id. (adding § 2750.3(a)(1)(C) to the California Labor Code). 
 11. Id. (adding § 2750.3(a)(1)(B) to the California Labor Code). 
 12. A.B.5: Cal. Assemb. B. 5 § 2 (adding § 2750(a)(3), incorporating S.G. Borello & Sons by 
reference); S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Rel., 769 P.2d 399 (Cal. 1989). 
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Those seeking to expand the coverage of employment-based protective 
legislation can count A.B.5 as a significant, but limited, victory.  Those seeking 
to simplify, clarify, and unify the law cannot. 
The last section of this Article discusses the ongoing debate about employee 
status going forward from A.B.5.  The political forces and policy considerations 
that molded A.B.5 will be the same in other states and in Congress as they 
grapple in the years ahead with the legal definition of employment.  A.B.5 makes 
clear that state and federal legislators will confront a trade-off.  They can expand 
the coverage of employment-based regulatory laws to cover more workers in the 
modern economy, or they can simplify and unify the legal definition of 
employee status.  They cannot do both.  Indeed, efforts to enlarge the coverage 
of protective legislation will make the law of employee status more complex and 
less uniform—as did A.B.5.  The political forces and policy considerations that 
shaped A.B.5 in the California legislature will be at play on Capitol Hill and in 
the legislatures of the other forty-nine states. 
A.B.5 might suggest to some the need to scrap altogether the distinction 
between employees and independent contractors.  For others, A.B.5 and its 
complexities might suggest that the prospect of simplification of the law in this 
area was always a chimera. 
Two generations ago, Professor Charles E. Lindblom famously catalogued the 
benefits of “muddling through.”13  Some problems do not lend themselves to 
neat and comprehensive solutions.  A.B.5 confirms that the legal definition of 
employment is one of these.  It would be attractive if the legal definition of who 
is an employee could be simplified and made more uniform.  But as A.B.5 
demonstrates, this is not in the cards nor should it be, given the various functions 
that employee status plays in different areas of the law and the contending policy 
and political pressures molding the law in this area. 
Whatever the merits of A.B.5 might be, uniformity, simplicity, and certainty 
are not among these.  Those who seek to emulate A.B.5 will confront the same 
trade-off as did the legislators of the Golden State.  The definition of “employee” 
can be made simpler and more uniform, or it can be broadened to include more 
workers in the modern economy.  But A.B.5 indicates the trade-off between 
these two prescriptions for the legal definition of employment.  “Muddling 
through” was the past and is the future of the law of employee status, given the 
political influences and policy concerns that will mold federal and state 
legislation in this area. 
                                                 
 13. Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through”, 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79 
(1959). 
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I.  WHO IS AN EMPLOYEE?  COMPARING THE CONTEXTS AND THE TESTS 
A.  Overview 
This section introduces and compares the four basic tests for determining an 
individual’s status as an employee rather than an independent contractor: the 
common law control test; the ABC test; the “economic realities” standard; and 
inquiry into statutory purpose.  This section explores these tests in the context 
of three important areas of law in which status as an employee carries significant 
legal consequences: taxes, torts, and protective legislation.  In the tax context, 
status as an employee shifts tax-withholding obligations to the employer, and it 
also makes available certain benefits limited to taxpayers in their respective 
capacities as employees.  In the tort setting, classifying an individual as an 
employee extends liability to her employer under the doctrine of respondeat 
superior.  In the context of employment-based protective legislation, a 
characterization of an individual as an employee triggers the coverage of such 
legislation while classifying that person as an independent contractor places her 
beyond such protection.14 
B.  Federal Taxes and the Common Law Definition of Employment 
In the federal tax context, whether an individual is classified as an “employee” 
is determined under what is today often designated as the common law test of 
employment.  For purposes of payroll (FICA) taxation, the Internal Revenue 
Code defines an “employee” as “any individual who, under the usual common 
law rules applicable in determining the employer-employee relationship, has the 
status of an employee . . . .”15  The Treasury Regulations implementing this 
statute emphasize that the touchstone for determining status as a common law 
employee is control, namely, whether “the person for whom services are 
performed has the right to control and direct the individual who performs the 
services, not only as to the result to be accomplished by the work but also as to 
the details and means by which that result is accomplished.”16 
The Treasury Regulations define employee status for wage withholding 
purposes in essentially identical, control-oriented terms,17 adding the caveat that 
                                                 
 14. There are many other areas of the law where the concept of being an “employee” is 
crucial.  For example, in copyright law, the status of a worker as an employee vel non may 
determine whether the worker’s creation belongs to the worker or to the employer who hired her.  
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “work made for hire” as “a work prepared by an employee within 
the scope of his or her employment”); see also Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 
730, 741 (1989) (“[T]he term ‘employee’ should be understood in light of the general common law 
of agency.”).  Nevertheless, for purposes of analyzing the background against which A.B.5 was 
adopted, the most useful areas of the law to examine are taxes, torts, and protective regulation. 
 15. I.R.C. § 3121(d)(2).  The Code also incorporates this definition under the Federal 
Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA).  See I.R.C. § 3306(i). 
 16. Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(d)-1(c)(2) (as amended in 1980). 
 17. Treas. Reg. § 31.3401(c)-1(b) (as amended in 1970). 
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“[g]enerally, physicians, lawyers, dentists, veterinarians, contractors, 
subcontractors, public stenographers, auctioneers, and others who follow an 
independent trade, business, or profession, in which they offer their services to 
the public, are not employees.”18 
In Revenue Ruling 87-41, the IRS identifies twenty factors to be considered 
when assessing the existence vel non of control for purposes of classifying 
workers as employees or independent contractors under the common law test.19  
This administrative ruling and its twenty-factor test reveal the fact-specific 
nature of the common law control test.  The ruling itself acknowledges the 
uncertainties of the twenty-factor standard: 
The degree of importance of each factor varies depending on the 
occupation and the factual context in which the services are 
performed.  The twenty factors are designed only as guides for 
determining whether an individual is an employee; special scrutiny is 
required in applying the twenty factors to assure that formalistic 
aspects of an arrangement designed to achieve a particular status do 
not obscure the substance of the arrangement . . . .20 
After acknowledging that the twenty-factor test is fact—and context—
dependent, Revenue Ruling 87-41 enumerates these factors: (1) whether a 
worker must comply with “instructions about when, where, and how he or she 
is to work”; (2) whether a worker is required to undergo training; (3) whether a 
worker is “[i]ntegrat[ed] . . . into the business operations” for which he or she 
works; (4) whether the services to be performed by an individual “must be 
rendered personally” by that individual; (5) whether the individual whose 
employment status is being determined “hires, supervises, and pays” others; (6) 
whether there is “[a] continuing relationship between the worker and the person 
or persons for whom the services are performed”; (7) whether the person whose 
status as an employee vel non is being determined has “set hours of work” 
established for him or her; (8) whether the work is full-time or not; (9) whether 
the work is performed on the employee’s premises or “on the premises of the 
person or persons for whom the services are performed”; (10) whether “a worker 
must perform services in the order or sequence set by the person or persons for 
whom the services are performed”; (11) whether “the worker [must] submit 
regular or written reports to the person or persons for whom the services are 
performed”; (12) whether the person whose employment status is being 
determined is paid “by the hour, week, or month” or is instead paid “a lump sum 
agreed upon as the cost of a job”; (13) whether the worker or the service 
purchaser “pay[s] the worker’s business and/or traveling expenses”; (14) 
whether the worker furnishes his or her own “tools, materials, and other 
equipment”; (15) whether “the worker invests in facilities that are used by the 
                                                 
 18. Id. § 31.3401(c)-1(c). 
 19. Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296, at 10–18. 
 20. Id. at 10–11. 
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worker in performing services”; (16) whether the individual whose employment 
status is being determined “can realize a profit or suffer a loss as a result of the 
worker’s services (in addition to the profit or loss ordinarily realized by 
employees)”; (17) whether an individual works “for [m]ore [t]han [o]ne [f]irm 
at a [t]ime”; (18) whether “a worker makes his or her services available to the 
general public on a regular and consistent basis”; (19) whether the service 
purchaser has “(t)he right to discharge a worker . . . indicating that the worker is 
an employee and the person possessing the right is an employer”; and (20) 
whether “the worker has the right to end his or her relationship with the person 
for whom the services are performed at any time he or she wishes without 
incurring liability.”21 
In addition to triggering an employer’s obligation to withhold taxes from an 
employee, employee status also determines whether an individual is eligible for 
the many tax benefits tied to this status.  Most prominently, the Internal Revenue 
Code’s exclusion of health insurance premiums from the gross income of the 
insured depends upon the insured being an employee of the entity paying the 
premiums.22 
Critics of the common law control test of employee status disparaged this fact-
based, multifactored standard as indeterminate even before the rise of the so-
called “gig” economy.23  That indeterminacy is compounded by the emergence 
of newer economic relationships driven by such contemporary phenomenon as 
internet platforms and telecommuting.24  
C.  Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Darden: The U.S. Supreme 
Court Embraces the Common Law Control Test 
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Darden is the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s most recent decision on the definition of an employee.25  For purposes 
of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),26 the Court 
embraced the common law control test as reflecting congressional intent, even 
as the Court acknowledged the imprecision of that test.27 
Mr. Darden had been an exclusive insurance agent for Nationwide.28  As such 
an agent, he participated in Nationwide’s “Agent’s Security Compensation 
                                                 
 21. Id. at 11–18. 
 22. I.R.C. § 106(a).  See also I.R.C. § 132 (conditioning a variety of exclusions from gross 
income upon the taxpayer’s status as an employee). 
 23. See, e.g., Marc Linder, What Is an Employee?  Why It Does, But Should Not, Matter, 7 L. 
& INEQ. 155, 158 (1989). 
 24. See discussion infra Section IV.B. 
 25. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323–25 (1992). 
 26. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 § 
3(6) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.). 
 27. Darden, 503 U.S. at 323–25. 
 28. Id. at 320. 
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Plan.”29  After Nationwide terminated its relationship with Mr. Darden, he sold 
insurance policies for Nationwide’s competitors.30  Nationwide thereupon 
claimed that Mr. Darden’s activities on behalf of Nationwide’s competitors 
caused Mr. Darden to forfeit his deferred compensation benefits under this 
retirement plan.31  Mr. Darden responded that such forfeiture violated his rights 
under ERISA.32  As a statutory matter, Mr. Darden could assert rights under 
ERISA only if he had been an employee of Nationwide.33  Nationwide argued 
that he was not.34 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that Mr. Darden might 
have been an employee for ERISA purposes.35  The appeals court observed that 
ERISA’s statutory definition of an “employee”—"any individual employed by 
an employer”—"provides little guidance.” 36  Moreover, under “the traditional 
common-law standard,” Mr. Darden “most probably would not qualify as an 
employee” of Nationwide.37  That common law standard examines “[m]any 
factors” to determine whether the putative employer, Nationwide, has the “right 
to direct and control the performance of” the alleged employee, that is, Mr. 
Darden.38 
However, the appeals court reasoned, the multifactor common law test of 
control was “not the appropriate standard” for determining employee status 
under ERISA.39  Instead, “the definition of ‘employee’ should be tailored to the 
purposes of the statute being construed.”40  On remand, the appeals court held 
that Mr. Darden should be allowed to present evidence that classifying him as 
                                                 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 321.  To invoke ERISA’s civil remedies provision, an individual must be a 
“participant” in a plan.  Being a “participant,” in turn, requires that the individual be an “employee” 
of the firm establishing the plan.  See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6) (defining “employee” for ERISA 
purposes); 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7) (defining “participant” for ERISA purposes); 29 U.S.C. § 
1132(a)(1)(B) (establishing a “participant[‘s]” cause of action).  For further discussion, see JOHN 
H. LANGBEIN ET. AL., PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 99–103, 712, 714–16 (6th ed. 2015) 
(discussing ERISA’s definitions of “employee” and “participant,” as well as the participant’s right 
to sue under ERISA § 502); LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & KATHRYN L. MOORE, LAW OF EMPLOYEE 
PENSION AND WELFARE BENEFITS 66–81, 415–29 (3d ed. 2010) (discussing ERISA’s definition of 
“employee” and the participant’s right to sue under ERISA § 502). 
 34. Darden, 503 U.S. at 320. 
 35. Darden v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, 796 F.2d 701, 709 (4th Cir. 1986). 
 36. Id. at 704.  See also 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6). 
 37. Id. at 704–05. 
 38. Id. at 705. 
 39. Id. at 706. 
 40. Id. 
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an employee, rather than an independent contractor, would advance “the 
objectives and purposes of ERISA.”41 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the common law test of control 
informed by principles of agency law was the appropriate standard for 
determining employee status under ERISA.42  ERISA’s statutory definition of 
an “‘employee’ as ‘any individual employed by an employer’ is completely 
circular and explains nothing.’”43  Under these circumstances, “a common law 
test” of employee status is proper for ERISA purposes.44  That test, animated by 
“traditional agency law principles,” is a multifactored inquiry focused upon the 
alleged employer’s right to control the asserted employee.45  Among other 
authorities, the Supreme Court cited Revenue Ruling 87-41 as “setting forth 20 
factors as guides in determining whether an individual qualifies as a common-
law ‘employee’ in various tax law contexts.”46  
ERISA’s “circular” definition of “employee,” the Court observed, contrasts 
with the broader language of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).47  The FLSA 
defines “employ” as meaning “to suffer or permit to work.”48  This statutory 
language is of “striking breadth” and “stretches the [FLSA’s] meaning of 
‘employee’ to cover some parties who might not qualify as such under a strict 
application of traditional agency law principles.”49 
“To be sure,” the Darden court acknowledged with considerable 
understatement, “the traditional agency law criteria offer no paradigm of 
determinacy.”50  However, such a fact-intensive, common law approach to 
employee status should prevail for ERISA purposes. 
Central to the high court’s analysis was its perception of congressional intent.  
In concluding that the definition of an employee for ERISA purposes should be 
gleaned from ERISA’s statutory purposes, the Court of Appeals cited the high 
court’s opinions in NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., in which the Court 
defined the term “employee” under the National Labor Relations Act,51 and 
United States v. Silk, where the Court defined “employee” under the Social 
                                                 
 41. Id. at 707, 709.  This purpose-based approach to employee status has venerable roots.  See, 
e.g., Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 218 F. 547, 552–53 (2d Cir. 1914) (stating in a majority 
opinion by Judge Learned Hand that employee status “must be understood with reference to the 
purpose of the act”). 
 42. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323–25 (1992). 
 43. Darden, 503 U.S. at 323.  See also 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6). 
 44. Darden, 503 U.S. at 323. 
 45. Id. at 323–24. 
 46. Id. at 324. 
 47. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219. 
 48. 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(e)(1), (g). 
 49. Darden, 503 U.S. at 326. 
 50. Id. at 327. 
 51. NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, 322 U.S. 111, 120–29 (1944); see also Darden v. Nationwide 
Mutual Insurance Company, 796 F.2d 701, 706 (4th Cir. 1986) (citing to Hearst Publ’ns). 
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Security Act.52  Both of these decisions defined the term “employee” more 
“broad[ly] than the common-law definition.”53  Congress responded to these two 
opinions by amending the statutes in question to endorse, in lieu of a broader 
definition of “employee” geared toward statutory purpose, “the usual common-
law principles” defining who is an employee based on a multifactor control 
test.54 
We see in Darden several of the themes that govern the discussion in this area 
of the law.  None of the possible tests for employee status is a “paradigm of 
determinacy.”55  Multifactor tests never are, but neither are inquiries into 
statutory purpose or “control.”  Focusing on “control” for employment purposes 
requires determination of how much control is necessary to shift an individual’s 
status from an independent contractor to an employee.  Another formulation of 
employee status—"economic realities” under the “suffer or permit” standard—
is understood to be broader than the common law test, but it is no model of 
determinacy either.  Indeed, applied literally, the “suffer or permit” test could 
include the universe of independent contractor relationships—a result no one 
thinks is sensible under the FLSA or under other laws regulating employment 
that use the “suffer or permit” test to define who is an employee.56 
D.  S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations: Control 
and Statutory Purpose as Touchstones of Employee Status 
In S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations,57 the 
California Supreme Court, over dissent,58 held that “sharefarmers,” who 
harvested cucumbers for a grower, were the grower’s employees rather than 
independent contractors for purposes of California’s Workers’ Compensation 
Act (“the Act”).59  Central to the Borello court’s holding was the control 
exercised by the grower over the sharefarmers and the court’s perception of the 
purposes of the Act.60 
The Borello court observed that the common law rule tying employee status 
to the control exercised over the employee originally arose in the tort context of 
                                                 
 52. United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 713–14 (1947); see also Darden, 796 F.2d at 706 
(citing to Silk). 
 53. Darden, 503 U.S. at 324–25. 
 54. Id.  New York’s Court of Appeals has recently taken a similar approach in determining 
that a delivery courier working through a digital platform was an “employee” for unemployment 
insurance purposes.  See Matter of Vega, 149 N.E.3d 401, 405–06 (N.Y. 2020). 
 55. Darden, 503 U.S. at 327. 
 56. For examples of other laws, see, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-4-21(A) (“‘[E]mploy’ 
includes suffer or permit to work . . . .”); TENN. CODE ANN. §50-2-201(2) (LexisNexis 2020) 
(“‘Employ’ includes to suffer or permit to work . . . .”). 
 57. S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t Indus. Rels., 769 P.2d 399 (Cal. 1989). 
 58. Id. at 410–11 (Kaufman, J., dissenting). 
 59. Id. at 346; see also CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 3200–4386 (Deering 2020). 
 60. Borello, 769 P.2d at 404, 406–08. 
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“vicarious liability.”61  If a person has the “right to control” the “activities” 
performed for him by another, it is compelling for tort purposes to designate the 
controlling person as the “employer,” liable for “the misconduct of [the] person 
rendering service to” the employer.62  Protective legislation, such as 
unemployment-compensation laws and workers’ compensation statutes, 
subsequently incorporated the distinction between employees controlled by 
others (covered by such legislation) and independent contractors (not so 
covered).  In light of this history, “the right to control work details is the ‘most 
important’ or ‘most significant’ consideration” when determining whether or not 
service providers are employees protected as such by employment-based laws.63 
But, according to Borello, this “right to control work” is not the only 
consideration.  In determining whether or not a service provider is an employee 
for purposes of protective legislation, the existence vel non of control must be 
supplemented by other “‘secondary’ indicia” as well as by “the ‘history and 
fundamental purposes’ of the statute” in question.64  Accordingly, “under the 
Act, the ‘control-of-work-details’ test for determining whether a person 
rendering service to another is an ‘employee’ or an excluded ‘independent 
contractor’ must be applied with deference to the purposes of the protective 
legislation.”65 
Utilizing this two-part test based on control and statutory purpose, the Borello 
court concluded that the sharefarmers working for the cucumber grower were 
employees of the grower for purposes of the Act rather than independent 
contractors.  The grower in Borello “retains all necessary control over the 
harvest option of its operations.”66  In addition, coverage of the sharefarmers as 
employees under the Act facilitates the “public purpose” of the Act of 
“recogni[zing] that if the financial risk of job injuries is not placed upon the 
businesses which produce them, it may fall upon the public treasury.”67   
E.  Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. The Superior Court of Los Angeles 
County: California’s Supreme Court Adopts the ABC Test 
The California Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Dynamex Operations 
West, Inc. v. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County contrasts with Borello 
and reflects the growth at the state level of what has come to be called the “ABC 
test” for employee status.68 
                                                 
 61. Id. at 403. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 404. 
 64. Id. at 404–05. 
 65. Id. at 406. 
 66. Id. at 408. 
 67. Id. at 409. 
 68. Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Court, 416 P.3d 1, 35 (Cal. 2018). 
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Dynamex operates a one-day delivery service throughout the nation, including 
in California.69  While Dynamex previously treated its drivers as employees, 
since 2004 Dynamex has characterized its drivers as “independent contractors . 
. . requir[ing them] to provide their own vehicles and pay for all of their 
transportation expenses . . . .”70  Dynamex drivers can hire their own personnel 
to deliver Dynamex packages.71  When not delivering for Dynamex, drivers can 
work for competitive services or can operate their own personal delivery 
services.72 
Ultimately, the plaintiff class in Dynamex was limited to those drivers who 
worked exclusively for Dynamex by themselves.73  This limitation excluded 
from the plaintiff class those Dynamex drivers who hired their own personnel or 
who also made deliveries for a Dynamex competitor or for their own account.  
The substantive issue posed was whether Dynamex drivers who exclusively 
worked by themselves for Dynamex were, as Dynamex contended, independent 
contractors, or whether for purposes of the California “wage order” governing 
the transportation industry,74 such drivers were instead Dynamex employees.75 
The California wage order governs employees in the transportation industry 
and prescribes for them such working conditions as minimum wages and 
maximum hours.76  The wage order, in language similar to the federal FLSA,77 
defines the term “employ” to “mean[] to engage, suffer, or permit to work.”78  
Rather than the “economic realities” test, which the courts have developed under 
FLSA,79 the California court in Dynamex decreed that the “suffer or permit to 
work” standard should be understood as incorporating what has come to be 
called the “‘ABC’ test” for employee status.80 
Under this test, individuals are presumed to be employees (rather than 
independent contractors) of the person for whom they are hired to work.81  To 
overcome that presumption, and thereby establish the legal status of independent 
contractor, all prongs of a three-part ABC test must be satisfied.82  Prong A of 
                                                 
 69. Id. at 8. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 9. 
 74. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8 § 11090 (2020). 
 75. Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 5. 
 76. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 11090(3)–(4). 
 77. 29 U.S.C. § 203(g). 
 78. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 11090.2(D). 
 79. See, e.g., Acosta v. Jani-King of Okla., Inc., 905 F.3d 1156, 1160 (10th Cir. 2018). 
 80. Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 34–35.  The states have adapted the ABC test even as they have 
embraced it.  See Anna Deknatel & Lauren Hoff-Downing, ABC on the Books and in the Courts: 
An Analysis of Recent Independent Contractor and Misclassification Statutes, 18 U. PA. J.L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 53, 64–74 (2015). 
 81. See Cal. Assemb. B. 5 § 2 (adding § 2750.3(a)(1) to the California Labor Code). 
 82. Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 34. 
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this three-part test to avoid an employer-employee relationship is that the person 
for whom work is performed has neither legal nor practical control of the person 
performing such work.83  The second component, denoted as prong B, that must 
be proved to establish an independent contractor relationship is “that the worker 
performs work that is outside the usual course of the hiring entity’s business.”84  
Prong C of the ABC test is that the individual claiming to be an independent 
contractor must be “customarily engaged in an independently established trade, 
occupation, or business of the same nature as that involved in the work 
performed” by that individual for the person who hired her.85  Because of the 
presumption of employee status, all three elements of the ABC test must 
affirmatively be satisfied to overcome such presumption and thereby establish 
an independent contractor relationship.86  
The term ABC test is something of a misnomer.  In important respects, the 
most important component of this standard is the preliminary point that might 
be designated as element “D”: Under the ABC rubric, there is a presumption of 
employee status—a presumption that is overcome only if all facets of the three-
part ABC test are affirmatively proven.  A more accurate, if less catchy, label 
for the ABC test would be “strong presumption of employee status.” 
A major challenge for the Dynamex court was distinguishing its embrace of 
the ABC test for employee status in light of Borello’s two-part standard for such 
status, control, and statutory purpose.  Dynamex met this challenge by focusing 
upon Borello’s discussion of statutory purpose to the exclusion of Borello’s 
comments about control: 
[A]lthough we have sometimes characterized Borello as embodying 
the common law control test or standard for distinguishing employees 
and independent contractors, it appears more precise to describe 
Borello as calling for resolution of the employee or independent 
contractor question by focusing on the intended scope and purposes of 
the particular statutory provision or provisions at issue.  In other 
words, Borello calls for application of a statutory purpose standard . . 
. .87 
This retrospective realignment88 of Borello enabled the Dynamex Court to 
embrace the ABC test for employee status under the California wage order as a 
better implementation of “the history and purpose” of that order.89 
                                                 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 35. 
 87. Id. at 19 (citation omitted). 
 88. See EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING vii, 7–8 (1948) (ebook) 
(discussing the manner in which courts “realign” their precedents to modify legal doctrine while 
simultaneously executing “the duty of the American judge to view the law as a fairly consistent 
whole.”). 
 89. Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 35. 
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F.  The Restatement of Agency: Respondeat Superior and the Common Law 
Control Test 
For purposes of the tort rule of respondeat superior, the Restatement of 
Agency endorses the common law control test for status as an employee: “an 
employee is an agent whose principal controls or has the right to control the 
manner and means of the agent’s performance of work . . . .”90 
The Restatement justifies this traditional control-based definition of 
employment in efficiency terms: “[a]n employer’s ability to exercise control 
over its employees’ work-related conduct enables the employer to take measures 
to reduce the incidence of tortious conduct.”91  The Restatement, like Revenue 
Ruling 87-41, lists many factors relevant to determining whether an individual 
is an employee or not.  Unsurprisingly, this nonexclusive list overlaps with 
Revenue Ruling’s 87-41’s multifactor test for common law employment status: 
[T]he extent of control that the agent and the principal have agreed the 
principal may exercise over details of the work; whether the agent is 
engaged in a distinct occupation or business; whether the type of work 
done by the agent is customarily done under a principal’s direction or 
without supervision; the skill required in the agent’s occupation; 
whether the agent or the principal supplies the tools and other 
instrumentalities required for the work and the place in which to 
perform it; the length of time during which the agent is engaged by a 
principal; whether the agent is paid by the job or by the time worked; 
whether the agent’s work is part of the principal’s regular business; 
whether the principal and the agent believe that they are creating an 
employment relationship; and whether the principal is or is not in 
business.  Also relevant is the extent of control that the principal has 
exercised in practice over the details of the agent’s work.92 
Further reflecting the overlap in this area, the Reporter’s Notes cite both the 
Internal Revenue Code and Darden as authorities for the fact-intensive common 
law control test of employment.93 
G.  Conclusion 
Darden, Borello, and Dynamex, as well as the relevant provisions of the tax 
law and of the Restatement of Agency, provide important background for 
discussion of the law of employee status and, ultimately, the adoption of A.B.5.  
As these materials indicate, the concept of employee status plays a different role 
in different contexts.  In the tax setting, classification of an individual as an 
employee shifts tax-withholding responsibilities to the employer hiring that 
individual and makes available certain tax benefits tied to employee status.  For 
                                                 
 90. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(3)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
 91. Id. § 7.07 cmt. b. 
 92. Id. § 7.07 cmt. f. 
 93. Id. § 7.07 rep.’s notes f. 
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tort law purposes, an individual’s status as an employee extends liability for the 
individual’s actions to her employer under the heading of respondeat superior. 
In the regulatory context, characterizing an individual as an employee triggers 
the protections of the law.  In Darden, Mr. Darden’s ability to invoke the 
protections of ERISA depended on whether he was an employee of Nationwide.  
In Borello, employee status caused sharefarmers to be covered by California’s 
Workers’ Compensation Act.  In Dynamex, the California wage order covering 
conditions in the transportation industry applied to selected Dynamex personnel 
because they were classified as employees and were thus covered by the wage 
order. 
Four major tests have evolved to determine whether an individual is an 
employee rather than an independent contractor: the common law control test, 
the “ABC” standard, the “economic realities” test, and inquiry into statutory 
purposes.  As we shall see in the next section of this Article, commentators have 
largely been critical of the law in this area. 
II.  COMMENTARY 
In this section, I explore the commentary in this area.  The relevant literature 
advances a variety of themes and proposals, largely critical of the current law of 
employee status.  Among these criticisms are the imprecise nature of the 
multifactor common law control test, particularly in the context of the modern 
“gig economy,” the alleged failure of contemporary law to extend employment-
based protection to individuals who need such protection, the desirability of 
adopting a third category to stand midway between status as an employee and 
status as an independent contractor, the creation of a presumption of employee 
status, the alleged need to increase penalties for employers that misclassify 
employees as independent contractors, and the need for definitions of employee 
status that are more simple and more uniform.  As I argue infra, A.B.5 indicates 
the tension among these concerns: expanding the coverage of employment-
based protection will make the law more complex and less uniform—as did 
A.B.5. 
Professor Marc Linder attacks current law as both imprecise and failing to 
protect workers who deserve the protection of laws regulating the workplace.94  
Statutes governing “unemployment compensation, workers compensation, 
collective bargaining rights, minimum wages and maximum hours, social 
security, pensions, occupational safety and health, and anti-discrimination 
protection” only cover “employees,” not independent contractors.95  “What an 
employee is, however, has often been left vague,” leaving current law, according 
to Professor Linder, a “hodgepodge” with “[n]o sound theoretical or empirical” 
justification.96 
                                                 
 94. Linder, supra note 23, at 158. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
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Professor Linder focuses upon “[t]wo rival tests” for defining whether “the 
employment relationship” exists: “the more restrictive control test and the more 
expansive economic reality of dependence test.”97  However, he concludes 
neither test generates “a principled position to distinguish between employers 
and independent contractors.”98  In the interest of greater legal uniformity and 
protection, Professor Linder suggests borrowing from certain foreign legal 
systems a third category for workers, “dependent contractors.”99 
Professors Seth D. Harris and Alan B. Krueger, writing under the auspices of 
The Hamilton Project, similarly support a third category for participants in the 
gig economy to be denoted as “independent worker.”100  Uber and Lyft drivers 
would be the prototypical “independent workers,”101 participants in the online 
economy who occupy “a middle ground” between employee and independent 
contractor status.102  Professors Harris and Krueger tell us that the problematic 
legal situation of gig economy workers stems from the unsettled nature of 
current law that consists of “collections of factors for consideration rather than 
clear thresholds or required elements.”103  Moreover, the emerging economic 
relationships of the modern economy do not fit the either/or choice of 
employment v. independent contracting: “the existing employee-independent 
contractor dichotomy does not offer a satisfying or reliable path in these new 
and emerging circumstances.”104 
To address these novel conditions, Professors Harris and Krueger call for 
federal and state legislation to create a new category of “independent worker.”105  
Independent workers, like employees, would have the legal right to organize and 
bargain collectively106 and would be protected by anti-discrimination laws.107  
For income tax and FICA purposes, independent workers would be treated in 
the same way as employees, that is, subject to withholding and employer 
contributions.108  However, such an independent worker would not receive 
“other protections and benefits, such as overtime protection or unemployment 
insurance.”109 
                                                 
 97. Id. at 172. 
 98. Id. at 175. 
 99. Id. at 185–86. 
 100. Seth D. Harris & Alan B. Krueger, A Proposal for Modernizing Labor Laws for Twenty-
First-Century Work: The “Independent Worker”, BROOKINGS: THE HAMILTON PROJECT 5 (2015) 
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 104. Id. at 8. 
 105. Id. at 5. 
 106. Id. at 15–17. 
 107. Id. at 17–18. 
 108. Id. at 18–19. 
 109. Id. at 19. 
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In contrast, Professor Miriam A. Cherry and Doctor Antonio Aloisi are 
skeptical of such third categories as “dependent contractors.”110  After exploring 
the experiences with such third categories in Canada, Spain, and Italy, they 
conclude that “fairness for workers” instead requires a “default rule” of 
“employee status or something that, at the very least, resembles it closely.”111 
Professor Cherry and Doctor Aloisi also highlight the status of workers “in 
the ‘gig,’ ‘on-demand’ ‘platform,’ or ‘sharing’ economy.”112  For these and other 
workers, employee status is necessary for them to receive the protection of 
minimum wage laws, anti-discrimination statutes, state unemployment 
compensation systems, and worker’s compensation laws.113  The common law 
control test as well as the economic realities standard, they argue, “are 
notoriously malleable, difficult, and fact-dependent,”114 leading to 
“indeterminate legal outcome[s].”115 
However, based on the Canadian, Spanish, and Italian experiences with 
intermediate categories between “employee” and “independent contractor,” 
Professor Cherry and Doctor Aloisi conclude that such categories entail their 
own “potential for misclassification, arbitrage, and confusion.”116  They instead 
suggest creating a general presumption of employee status: “above a minimum 
threshold of hours worked, the default classification would be an employment 
relationship.”117  
In a similar vein, Professor Christopher Buscaglia calls for substantive and 
procedural legislation to force more workers to be treated as employees.118  From 
his perspective, the core problem stems from the “common law factors” for 
employee status as reflected in “the IRS 20-factor test.”119  He calls for laws 
providing “a clear and unambiguous definition of ‘independent contractor[,]’” 
as well as legislation which “directly punishes acts of misclassification by 
employers.”120 
Citing studies indicating that many employees are misclassified as 
independent contractors,121 Professor Buscaglia calls for legislation providing a 
                                                 
 110. Miriam A. Cherry & Antonio Aloisi, “Dependent Contractors” in the Gig Economy: A 
Comparative Approach, 66 AM. U.L. REV. 635, 637, 640 (2017). 
 111. Id. at 693–40. 
 112. Id. at 641. 
 113. Id. at 642. 
 114. Id. at 642–43. 
 115. Id. at 645. 
 116. Id. at 681. 
 117. Id. at 683. 
 118. Christopher Buscaglia, Crafting a Legislative Solution to the Economic Harm of 
Employee Misclassification, 9 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 111, 113 (2009). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 114–19. 
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“uniform” definition of “independent contractor . . . for all purposes.”122  This 
definition would eschew “multi-factor tests like the ‘right to control’ or the IRS 
test, which are difficult to apply and do not lead to consistent and predictable 
outcomes.”123 
Instead, under Professor Buscaglia’s uniform definition of “independent 
contractor,” an individual would, as a substantive matter, be deemed to be an 
independent contractor only if each of nine criteria are satisfied.124  Under this 
proposal, an individual would be an independent contractor only if she: “(i) 
maintains a separate business with the individual’s own business location, 
equipment, materials, and other facilities”‘125 “(ii) holds or has applied for a 
federal employer identification number or has filed business or self-employment 
tax returns with the Internal Revenue Service”;126 “(iii) operates under contracts 
to perform specific services for specific amounts of money”;127 “(iv) incurs the 
expenses related to the service performed under the contract”;128 “(v) is 
personally liable for the failure to complete the service”;129 “(vi) receives 
compensation for services performed under a contract on a commission or per-
job basis and not on any other basis”;130 “(vii) may realize a profit or suffer a 
loss under a contract to perform service”;131 “(viii) has continuing and/or 
recurrent business liabilities and obligations”;132 and “(ix) the success or failure 
of the individual’s business depends on the relationship of business receipts to 
expenditures.”133  Under this proposed test, “[i]f proof of any one factor is 
deficient, the worker is deemed an employee.”134  
Procedurally under Professor Buscaglia’s proposed regime, a hiring entity 
must seek certification in advance that a person to be hired as an independent 
contractor satisfies all nine of these criteria.135  Professor Buscaglia would 
bolster his regime with personal liability similar to the “responsible person” 
                                                 
 122. Id. at 130. 
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provisions that impose payroll tax136 and sales tax137 responsibilities upon 
corporate officers and individuals.138  If an employer flouts the rules pertaining 
to alleged individual contractors, strict civil liability and potential criminal 
penalties would be imposed upon the responsible corporate officer or LLC 
manager.139 
The presumption of employee status and harsher penalties for 
misclassification are echoed in a student note that compares Indiana’s treatment 
of employees and independent contractors with the laws of other states.140  Like 
other critiques of current law, this note criticizes the “lack of uniformity” in the 
law’s various tests of employee status and “the complexity of the tests.”141  
Among its remedies, this note proposes a private right of action under which an 
individual misclassified as an independent contractor could recover the “‘wages, 
salary, employment benefits, or other compensation denied or lost’” as a result 
of such misclassification.142  In addition, this note proposes that civil penalties 
be imposed on employers who misclassify employees as independent 
contractors143 and that the states establish a presumption of employee status.144 
Dean David Weil describes what he calls the “fissured workplace.”145  In an 
earlier era, most workers had a “direct employment relationship”146 “with a 
single, well-defined employer with direct responsibility in hiring and firing, 
managing, training, compensation, and development of its workforce.”147  
Today, in contrast, functions and relationships previously conducted by a single, 
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v. United States, 436 U.S. 238, 247 (1978) (“Sections 6672 and 7202 were designed to assure 
compliance by the employer with its obligation to withhold and pay the sums withheld, by 
subjecting the employer’s officials responsible for the employer’s decisions regarding withholding 
and payment to civil and criminal penalties for the employer’s delinquency.”); United States v. 
Hartman, 896 F.3d 759, 761 (6th Cir. 2018) (discussing responsible person liability). 
 137. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-414a (2020) (imposing personal sales tax liability upon 
“any officer or employee of any corporation . . . and a member or employee of any partnership or 
limited liability company who, as such officer, employee or member, is under a duty” to collect 
and pay sales tax); TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-1-1443 (2020) (imposing personal sales tax liability 
upon “an officer or employee of a corporation who, as such officer or employee, is under a duty” 
to collect and pay sales taxes); Yik C. Lo v. Comm’r of Revenue, Nos. 8359-R, 8454-R, 2016 Minn. 
Tax LEXIS 17, at *24–25 (Minn. T.C., Apr. 7, 2016) (discussing responsible person liability for 
state sales taxes). 
 138. Buscaglia, supra note 118, at 131–32. 
 139. Id. 
 140. See John DeRoss, Jr., Note, Misclassification of Employees as Independent Contractors 
in Indiana: A State Legislative Solution, 50 IND. L. REV. 673, 674 (2017). 
 141. Id. at 675. 
 142. Id. at 692–93 (quoting 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 185/60 (LexisNexis 2016)). 
 143. Id. at 694. 
 144. Id. at 694–95. 
 145. DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR SO MANY 
AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT 7 (2014). 
 146. Id. at 9. 
 147. Id. at 180. 
2020] Defining Who Is an Employee After A.B.5 21 
all-encompassing employer are divided among and subcontracted to “multiple 
organizations.”148  This causes the contemporary workplace to be “fissured” 
among different employing entities.149 
To take a simple case, consider the Dynamex driver who hires and pays her 
own workers.  These second-tier drivers are employed by the first-tier driver 
who has a direct relationship with Dynamex.  These second-tier drivers, while 
not immediately employed by Dynamex, are nevertheless part of the broader 
Dynamex enterprise and are regulated by the policies Dynamex imposes upon 
the first-tier driver with which Dynamex has a direct relationship.  These second-
tier drivers may wear Dynamex uniforms150 and may place the Dynamex logo 
on their delivery trucks151 even though their paychecks come not from Dynamex 
itself, but from the first-tier driver who receives her payments from Dynamex. 
Or consider the employees of a fast-food franchisee.  These employees receive 
their paychecks and direct supervision from the franchisee who operates the 
restaurant at which these employees work.152  But these employees wear the 
franchisor’s uniforms and implement policies that the franchisor imposes upon 
the franchisee.153 
Many situations in the fissured workplace are more complex than these cases.  
Frequently, corporations, which in an earlier age directly employed individuals 
to perform a variety of functions, today subcontract those functions to “multiple 
organizations.”154  Customers and other members of the public are typically 
unaware that persons with whom they interact are actually employed by these 
entities with subcontracts because these persons appear to the public to be 
employees of the corporation that has outsourced its staffing function.  The rise 
of the fissured workplace has placed new pressure on the concept of “joint 
employment”155 under which two related entities, e.g., franchisor and franchisee, 
might both be deemed to be employers of the persons who are controlled by the 
franchisee subject to the overriding supervision of the franchisor. 
                                                 
 148. Id. at 7. 
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As part of his program for “mending”156 the fissured workplace, Dean Weil 
highlights a variety of legislative proposals157 and enforcement practices.158  
Among these are the ABC definition of employment.159 
In a similar fashion, Attorneys Anna Deknatel and Lauren Hoff-Downing 
consider a variety of state responses to the “rampant culture of misclassification” 
in which employees are erroneously characterized as independent contractors.160  
They support the ABC test along with enhanced penalties for worker 
misclassification.161 
Attorneys Deknatel and Hoff-Downing catalogue the different ways in which 
various states have formulated the ABC test.162  After reviewing these varied 
versions of the ABC formula, they endorse “[r]evising statutes towards [the 
ABC] test [as] a particularly effective measure when it creates a set of laws that 
provide one independent contracting definition across all workers.”163 
Professor Katherine V.W. Stone characterizes the evolution of the 
contemporary workplace as “the decline of [the] standard contract of 
employment.”164  According to Professor Stone, “[t]he employment relationship 
is being transformed from a long-term stable relationship between an employee 
and a firm to one in which the employee is a free agent operating in a 
boundaryless workplace.”165  Central to this transformation has been the legal 
characterization of workers as independent contractors: “[t]he test for 
independent contractor status is broad, so many who depend on a particular 
employer for their livelihood are classified as independent contractors and 
deprived of all employment law protections.”166 
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) shares the consensus belief 
that “[t]he common law rules for classifying workers are unclear and subject to 
conflicting interpretations,”167 in part because “the tests used to determine 
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whether a worker is an independent contractor or an employee are complex and 
differ from law to law.”168 
In short, the commentary is largely critical of the current law of employee 
status, characterizing the law as too complex, too imprecise, and too limited, 
particularly in the context of the modern “gig economy.”  The legal 
commentators call for definitions of employee status that are simpler, more 
uniform, and more comprehensive.  As I discuss infra, A.B.5 demonstrates the 
tensions among these concerns.   
III.  DESCRIBING A.B.5 
Against this background, California adopted A.B.5.  This statute purports to 
codify Dynamex and the ABC test for the purposes of the California Labor and 
Unemployment Insurance Codes and for all wage orders of the California 
Industrial Welfare Commission.169  However, A.B.5 creates so many exceptions 
to Dynamex and the ABC standard that A.B.5 can just as plausibly be 
characterized as a partial codification of Borello and its test for employee status.  
Moreover, A.B.5 does not address the issue of employee status in the tort context 
and has inconsistent implications for employee status in the state tax setting. 
Section 2 of A.B.5170 declares, as a general rule, that employee status is to be 
determined under the ABC test for purposes of California’s Labor and 
Unemployment Insurance Codes and for the wage orders of California’s 
Industrial Welfare Commission.171  Consequently for these purposes, any 
“person providing labor or services for remuneration shall” presumptively “be 
                                                 
 168. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-09-717, EMPLOYEE MISCLASSIFICATION: 
IMPROVED COORDINATION, OUTREACH, AND TARGETING COULD BETTER ENSURE DETECTION 
AND PREVENTION 3 (2009), https://www.gao.gov/assets/300/293679.pdf. 
 169. Cal. Assemb. B. 5, Leg. Couns. Dig.  A.B.5 also amended the provisions of the California 
Labor Code pertaining to Workers’ Compensation and Insurance as well as provisions of the 
California Unemployment Insurance Code.  See id. §§ 3–5.  A.B.5 also authorized the California 
attorney general, as well as city attorneys and prosecutors, to pursue injunctive relief “to prevent 
the continued misclassification of employees as independent contractors . . . .”  Id. § 2 (adding § 
2750.3(j) to the California Labor Code). 
 170. Id. (adding § 2750.3 to the California Labor Code).  A ballot measure to repeal A.B.5 will 
be voted upon by the California electorate this November.  Hannah Wiley, Uber, Lyft and 
DoorDash Initiative Seeking Labor Law Exemption Heads to California Voters, THE SACRAMENTO 
BEE (May 22, 2020, 6:54 PM), https://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-
alert/article242948676.html.  In the meanwhile, California is suing Uber and Lyft about the 
employee status of their drivers.  See Paul Jones, California Seeks Injunction Against Uber, Lyft 
Over Worker Status, Taxes, TAX NOTES (June 26, 2020), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-
today-state/litigation-and-appeals/california-seeks-injunction-against-uber-lyft-over-worker-
status-taxes/2020/06/26/2cnm0.  The California Superior Court has ruled for California, but the 
trial court’s injunction has been suspended by the Court of Appeals.  See People v. Uber Techs., 
Inc., No. CGC-20-584402 at 32 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 10, 2020) (order granting preliminary 
injunction).  See also Joel Rosenblatt, Uber, Lyft Win Delay on Converting Drivers to Employees, 
BLOOMBERG LAW NEWS (Aug. 20, 2020, 4:59 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-
report/uber-lyft-win-delay-on-order-converting-drivers-to-employees. 
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considered an employee rather than an independent contractor unless the hiring 
entity demonstrates” compliance with all three factors of the ABC test172: 
(A) The person is free from the control and direction of the hiring 
entity in connection with the performance of the work, both under the 
contract for the performance of the work and in fact. 
(B) The person performs work that is outside the usual course of the 
hiring entity’s business. 
(C) The person is customarily engaged in an independently established 
trade, occupation, or business of the same nature as that involved in 
the work performed.173 
However, having made this broad statement, A.B.5 then exempts numerous 
professions and occupations from the ABC test, thereby leaving these 
professions and occupations subject to Borello.174 
The exemptions of A.B.5 are detailed and daunting.  The exempted 
professions and occupations (subject to Borello rather than the ABC test for 
employee status) include licensed insurance personnel;175 licensed 
“physician[s,] dentist[s], podiatrist[s], psychologist[s, and] veterinarian[s]”;176 
licensed “lawyer[s], architect[s], engineer[s], private investigator[s, and] 
accountant[s]”;177 registered broker-dealers and investment advisors;178 certain 
“direct sales salesperson[s]”179 and commercial fishers;180 specific providers of 
marketing;181 human resources services;182 certain travel agents;183 graphic 
designers;184 “[g]rant writer[s]”;185 “[f]ine artist[s]”;186 “enrolled agent[s]” 
authorized to practice before the IRS;187 a “[p]ayment processing agent through 
                                                 
 172. Id. (adding § 2750.3(a)(1) to the California Labor Code). 
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an independent sales organization”;188 certain photographers and 
photojournalists;189 specified “freelance writer[s], editor[s] or newspaper 
cartoonist[s]”;190 licensed estheticians, electrologists, manicurists, barbers and 
cosmetologists who meet detailed requirements;191 licensed real estate agents;192 
licensed repossession agents;193 “bona fide business-to-business contracting 
relationship[s]” meeting certain standards;194 specified construction 
subcontractors;195 a “referral agency” and a “service provider” receiving a 
referral if the referral agency meets certain standards and connects clients with 
providers of “graphic design, photography, tutoring, event planning, minor 
home repair, moving, home cleaning, errands, furniture assembly, animal 
services, dog walking, dog grooming, web design, picture hanging, pool 
cleaning, or yard cleanup” services;196 and motor clubs, along with certain of 
their service providers.197  As I note below, many of these statutory exceptions 
are intricate with unclear boundaries.198 
A.B.5 has no impact on an individual’s status as an employee vel non in the 
tort context.  Thus, it is possible for an individual to be an employee for purposes 
of the ABC test embodied in A.B.5, but simultaneously be an independent 
contractor for tort law purposes under the common law control test. 
A.B.5’s impact in the state tax context is uneven.  On the one hand, A.B.5 
applies the ABC test for purposes of determining whether an individual is an 
employee for state wage withholding purposes.199  On the other hand, A.B.5 does 
not apply more generally to the California tax code.  Hence, it is possible for a 
worker to be an employee for purposes of state wage withholding under the ABC 
test while being an independent contractor for other state income tax purposes. 
Suppose, for example, that a California business provides health care 
coverage for an individual who qualifies as an employee under the ABC test but 
not under the common law control standard.  In this case, the business must 
withhold California income tax from the compensation it pays this individual 
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because she is an employee under the wage withholding provisions of the 
Unemployment Insurance Code as modified by A.B.5.  However, this individual 
cannot exclude the cost of her health care coverage from state gross income as 
she remains an independent contractor for general income tax purposes.200 
IV.  EVALUATING A.B.5 
A.  Overview 
A.B.5 is neither the panacea some of its advocates maintain nor the tragedy 
its opponents bemoan.  This section emphasizes four features of A.B.5.  First, 
the ABC test incorporated into A.B.5 has its own interpretative challenges.  
These ambiguities include the “control” standard,201 which the ABC inquiry 
borrows from the common law test of employee status, as well as such 
contestable notions as whether a worker “is customarily engaged in an 
independently established trade, occupation, or business”202 or “performs work 
that is outside the usual course of the hiring entity’s business.”203 
Second, as we have just seen, A.B.5 is replete with exemptions and 
exceptions.  The boundaries of these exemptions and exceptions are often 
opaque.  Third, it was an unfortunate drafting choice to repeatedly incorporate 
by reference Borello rather than stating in explicit statutory terms the rule the 
drafters of A.B.5 believe that Borello embodies.204  Fourth, A.B.5 has no impact 
on an individual’s status as an employee for tort purposes and an uneven impact 
on an individual’s status as an employee for state tax purposes.  It is thus 
possible, for example, for an individual to be an employee under A.B.5 for 
purposes of the Golden State’s employment-based protection laws while being 
an independent contractor for the tort rule of respondeat superior.  Whatever the 
merits of A.B.5 might be, simplicity, clarity, and uniformity are not among these. 
B.  The Ambiguities of the ABC Test 
Critics of the common law control test bemoan the uncertainties of that fact-
intensive, multifactor test.205  However, the ABC test is no model of clarity 
either.  Most obviously, the ABC test incorporates as prong A the standard of 
control.  That standard entails the same uncertainties and imprecisions under the 
ABC test as it does under the common law inquiry: how much authority must 
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the hiring person have and exercise to constitute “control” over the person hired?  
How are multifactor tests for control to be applied in particular cases? 
Sometimes, “control” is easily determined but often it is not, particularly in 
the modern economy of the “fissured” workplace where multiple persons and 
entities may each possess and exercise some authority over the worker whose 
status as an employee vel non is being determined.206  Consider, for example, an 
individual hired by a Dynamex driver.  Is this second-tier driver controlled by 
Dynamex via the quality standards Dynamex imposes directly upon its first-tier 
drivers; or is this second-tier driver controlled by the first-tier driver who stands 
between Dynamex and the second-tier driver?  If both Dynamex and the first-
tier driver “control” the second-tier driver, is that driver an employee of both 
Dynamex and the first-tier driver?  The answers to these questions under the 
ABC test are no more apparent than they are under the common law control test 
for employee status.  The presumption of employee status under the ABC test 
shifts the burden of overcoming these uncertainties onto the hiring person, who 
must prove the absence of legal and practical control to establish independent 
contractor status of the person hired.  But the uncertainties of the multifactor 
control test remain. 
In these and other situations, “control” for purposes of the ABC standard will 
be governed by the same kinds of multifactor tests promulgated under Rev. Rul. 
87-41207 and the Restatement of Agency.208  Those multifactor inquiries will 
yield no more certainty as part of the ABC rubric than they do under the common 
law control test. 
Similar ambiguities arise under prong B of the ABC test.  Prong B requires 
determination of the hiring entity’s business: to be an independent contractor 
rather than an employee, the service provider must “perform[] work that is 
outside the usual course of the hiring entity’s business.”209  Often it is easy to 
determine that entity’s business, but, again, in the modern economy, matters can 
frequently be more complex. 
Consider, for example, an online platform that matches persons who want to 
perform janitorial services with persons who need janitorial services.  Is that 
platform in the janitorial services business for purposes of prong B or is the 
platform’s business online matching?  That characterization is critical under 
prong B of the ABC test because, to satisfy that prong, the worker to be classified 
as an independent contractor must provide services “outside the usual course of 
the hiring entity’s business.”210 
If the online platform is deemed to be in the janitorial services business, then 
the worker providing such services falls within “the hiring entity’s business.”  If, 
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on the other hand, the online platform is characterized as conducting an internet 
matching business, then the worker providing janitorial services is, for purposes 
of prong B, “outside” the platform’s business because the worker is a janitor, not 
a computer matching service. 
Consider in this context the decision under prong B in Q.D.-A., Inc. v. Indiana 
Department of Workforce Development.211  In Q.D.-A, Inc., the hiring entity was 
a company which “matches drivers with customers who need large vehicles 
driven to them.”212  Indiana’s Supreme Court concluded that for purposes of the 
ABC test, the company and the drivers conduct different businesses because the 
company matching drivers and customers does not itself “provide drive-away 
services.”213 
This construction of prong B stands in contrast to the position of those who 
contend that A.B.5’s codification of the ABC test classifies Uber and Lyft 
drivers as employees.214  Q.D.-A, Inc.’s business model is similar to Uber’s and 
Lyft’s, that is, computer-based matching of transportation service providers and 
transportation customers.  The Indiana court found that for purposes of prong B 
such customer-matching is a different business than is conducted by the drivers 
themselves. 
Prong C of the ABC test is, depending on one’s perspective, intuitive or 
tautological: to be an independent contractor, a person providing services must 
be “engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession or 
business[.]”215  This comes close to saying that an independent contractor is a 
contractor who conducts independent activity.  Again, over time case law will 
emerge, but, in the meanwhile, the concept of an independent business will be 
contested for purposes of prong C.  There is, moreover, no assurance that, for 
the long run, different state courts will construe the concept of an independent 
business in the same way.  Indeed, there is a good chance that they will not. 
Consider again in this context the facts of Dynamex.216  In light of the 
interpretive ambiguities of the ABC test as codified in A.B.5, California courts 
could construe the ABC test in a way that classifies all Dynamex drivers as 
employees, including those drivers who engage other persons to work for them 
and those drivers who also work for other delivery services or for their own 
account.  If under prong A, Dynamex is deemed to exercise control over every 
driver who is delivering for Dynamex, then no driver overcomes the 
presumption of employee status because Dynamex exercises such control even 
if a driver also employs others.  Dynamex exercises such control while the driver 
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works for Dynamex, even though she works for other delivery companies on her 
own time.  The upshot under this scenario is that all Dynamex drivers are 
employees because Dynamex exercises control as to all of them. 
In yet another scenario, California’s courts could apply the ABC test, now 
codified in A.B.5, in a way that classifies Dynamex drivers as employees when 
they work full-time for Dynamex by themselves, but which classifies the 
remaining Dynamex drivers as independent contractors.  In this setting, 
Dynamex is deemed to exercise no control over any drivers.  Full-time Dynamex 
drivers would nevertheless be Dynamex employees because they do not have 
any independent business for purposes of prong C.  Thus, under this scenario, 
full-time drivers are Dynamex employees because, lacking any independent 
business, the statutory presumption of employee status remains intact.  On the 
other hand, drivers who deliver for other companies or for their own account 
would under this approach satisfy prong C and would thus be independent 
contractors because they have independent businesses. 
A situation in which some Dynamex drivers are employees and some are not 
would pose administrability challenges for Dynamex and other similarly situated 
California employers.  Such a situation would also be confusing for the drivers 
themselves and for those charged with the enforcement of California labor law.  
As different drivers shift their work patterns—from full-time to part-time, 
sometimes engaging other workers and sometimes not, at times working for 
other delivery services and at other times not—Dynamex (and any employer 
with a similar business model) would be expected to monitor and assess these 
changes as drivers would continually shift from employee status to independent 
contractor status and back again. 
In short, those hoping for greater clarity and simplicity in the law cannot take 
comfort from A.B.5’s adoption of the ABC test.  Whatever the merits of the 
ABC test may be, that test does not eliminate interpretive challenges in 
determining employee status.  Rather, the ABC standard introduces new 
interpretative challenges to the determination of employee status. 
C.  The Ambiguous Boundaries of A.B.5’s Exemptions 
As we have seen, A.B.5 is replete with exemptions and exceptions.217  The 
boundaries of these statutory exemptions and exceptions are often opaque. 
To take one example, consider A.B.5’s exemption from the ABC test for 
certain persons who perform “[m]arketing” services.218  To satisfy this 
exemption, an individual performing marketing services must, inter alia, 
undertake “work [that] is original and creative in character and the result of 
which depends primarily on the invention, imagination, or talent of the 
                                                 
 217. See Cal. Assemb. B. 5 § 2 (adding §§ 2750.3(b)(1)-(6), 2750.3(c)(2)(B)(i)-(xi), 
2750.3(d)(1)-(2), 2750.3(e), 2750.3(f), 2750.3(g), 2750.3(g)(2)(C), and 2750.3(h) to the California 
Labor Code). 
 218. Id. (adding § 2750.3(c)(2)(B)(i) to the California Labor Code). 
30 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 70.1:1 
[individual] . . . .”219  Over time, a body of case law may emerge that provides 
guidance under this fact-specific standard.  But in the short-run, more likely for 
the long-run, it will often be unclear whether marketing activity is “creative” 
enough or “imaginative” enough to qualify a marketer as an independent 
contractor for purposes of this A.B.5 exemption. 
A.B.5’s exemption from the ABC test for specified persons performing 
marketing services is part of a broader statutory exemption for a variety of 
“professional services” providers.220  Among the criteria for this broader 
exemption is that the professional service provider “customarily and regularly 
exercises discretion and independent judgment in the performance of the 
services.”221  This statutory language derives from the U.S. Department of Labor 
(DOL) regulations under FLSA.  Under the DOL regulations, one factor 
determining whether an individual is an administrative employee exempt from 
FLSA’s overtime pay requirements is whether the employee “exercise[s] . . . 
discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance.”222  
In 2001, California’s Industrial Welfare Commission incorporated this standard 
into its Wage Order 4-2001.223  In light of this history, when California courts 
construe A.B.5’s statutory exemption for certain professional service providers, 
they can logically look to the federal regulations defining “discretion and 
independent judgment” for FLSA purposes,224 as well as to the decisions of the 
federal225 and California226 courts applying this standard under the FLSA and 
Wage Order 4-2001. 
However, the courts caution that their decisions applying the “discretion and 
independent judgment” test are “fact-intensive,”227 focusing upon the “totality-
of-the-circumstances.”228  Even with interpretive guidance from the DOL’s 
overtime regulations and the existing federal and state case law, the standard of 
“discretion and independent judgment” is open-ended.  It will take much time 
for definitive signposts to emerge for purposes of A.B.5’s “discretion and 
judgment standard”—if such signposts ever emerge. 
                                                 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. (adding § 2750.3(c) to the California Labor Code). 
 221. Id. (adding § 2750.3(c)(1)(F) to the California Labor Code). 
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Take a third example: A.B.5’s exemption from the ABC test for “freelance 
writer[s], editor[s and] newspaper cartoonist[s].”229  This exemption only applies 
if the writer, editor, or cartoonist “provide[s] content submissions to the putative 
employer . . . 35 times” or fewer per year.230  For purposes of this test, “[i]tems 
of content produced on a recurring basis related to a general topic shall be 
considered separate submissions for purposes of calculating the 35 times per 
year.”231 
The drafters of A.B.5 could plausibly have decided that these and other 
ambiguities232 were necessary as a matter of policy or politics or both.  However, 
that drafting decision disappoints the expectations of those commentators 
seeking enhanced clarity and simplicity as to the legal definition of employment 
status.  Challenging interpretive issues arise under A.B.5’s exemptions from the 
ABC test.  Those who criticize current law as unclear, overly complex, and 
lacking uniformity can take no solace from A.B.5. 
D.  Incorporating Borello233 
A.B.5 repeatedly and explicitly incorporates by reference Borello.234  This 
drafting decision is problematic since it is unclear whether this statutory 
reference is intended to incorporate the original two-part test of Borello (control 
plus statutory purpose) or whether this reference is intended to reflect 
Dyanmex’s subsequent gloss on Borello (which emphasizes more heavily 
statutory purpose when determining an individual’s status vel non as an 
employee).235 
                                                 
 229. Cal. Assemb. B. 5 § 2(adding § 2750.3(c)(2)(B)(x) to the California Labor Code).  A.B.5’s 
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In particular cases, the two interpretations of Borello can point to contrasting 
conclusions.  Consider, for example, a situation in which a court concludes that, 
on the facts of the case, there is a weak argument for employee status under the 
common law control test, but there is a strong argument for employee status in 
light of statutory purpose.  The original text of Borello is unclear as to what the 
court should do in this situation because in this hypothetical example the two 
relevant factors—control and statutory purpose—pull in opposite directions. 
On the other hand, Dynamex’s realignment of Borello indicates that statutory 
purpose should be the dominant consideration in determining employee 
status.236  Hence, adhering to this interpretation of Borello, the outcome in this 
hypothetical situation is employee, rather than independent contractor, status 
because statutory purpose predominates.  Unfortunately, the drafting decision to 
incorporate Borello by name provides no guidance as to which version of 
Borello applies. 
Incorporating Borello by name into A.B.5 may have been a drafting glitch.  
Alternatively, incorporating Borello into the statute in this fashion could have 
implemented a political compromise, explicit or implicit, necessary to secure the 
law’s passage.  If the potential supporters of A.B.5 could not agree among 
themselves which version of Borello to endorse—control plus statutory purpose 
or just statutory purpose by itself—citing to Borello enabled both sides to 
support the resulting legislation in the hope of prevailing in the subsequent 
regulatory and judicial processes. 
Whether citing Borello by name was a poor drafting choice or “a child born 
of the silent union of legislative compromise,”237 the result is more uncertainty 
as to the contours of A.B.5 since the statute leaves it unclear which version of 
Borello controls under A.B.5. 
E.  Tort and Tax Status 
Another salient aspect of A.B.5 is the dog that didn’t bark:238 A.B.5 is silent 
on the subject of employee status in the context of torts.  A.B.5 thus disappoints 
those seeking greater uniformity in the legal definition of employment because 
an individual can be an employee for purposes of A.B.5 and California labor law 
while that same individual is still an independent contractor for tort purposes. 
Suppose, for example, that a freelance writer provides thirty-six annual 
submissions to a publisher, which does not control this writer, in the provision 
of his writing services.  Suppose further that furnishing these thirty-six 
submissions is a full-time occupation for the writer who works exclusively for 
this publisher. 
                                                 
 236. Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Court, 416 P.3d 1, 19–20 (Cal. 2018). 
 237. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 412 (1970). 
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On these facts, the writer is an employee for purposes of the ABC test, and 
the California Labor Code because the writer has no “independently established 
trade, occupation, or business[.]”239  He works full-time for one publisher and is 
not available for work for others.  This writer does not qualify for A.B.5’s 
exemption for freelance writers because he completes too many articles each 
year.240  Hence, for purposes of A.B.5, the statutory presumption of employee 
status prevails as to this writer. 
However, for tort purposes, this writer is an independent contractor because, 
in the tort setting, the common law control test remains in effect, and the 
publisher exercises no control over this writer.  If, for example, this writer libels 
someone in a column, the publisher has no respondeat superior liability for this 
tort—even though the publisher may have its own liability as publisher and even 
though the publisher is this writer’s employer for purposes of California labor 
law. 
This outcome may, as a matter of policy, be plausible because the tort law 
uses employee status for different purposes than that status serves in the context 
of protective legislation.  However, this outcome frustrates the expectations of 
those seeking uniformity across the law in defining who is an employee. 
Similar observations apply in the tax context.  As noted earlier, the impact of 
A.B.5 in the California tax context is uneven.241  A.B.5 controls for wage 
withholding purposes but not for other tax purposes.  Thus, this writer is an 
employee for state wage withholding but not for other purposes of the Golden 
State’s income tax statute.  Again, supporters of A.B.5 can claim victory by 
extending employee status for certain purposes of California law.  They cannot 
claim to have brought greater unity or simplicity to the definition of who is an 
employee. 
F.  Conclusion 
Whatever the merits of A.B.5 might be, uniformity, simplicity, and certainty 
are not among these.  The ABC test incorporated into A.B.5 has its own 
interpretative challenges.  Moreover, A.B.5 is replete with exemptions and 
exceptions, the boundaries of which are often opaque.  In addition, it was an 
unfortunate choice to incorporate by reference Borello, rather than stating in 
explicit statutory terms which interpretation of Borello A.B.5 embodies.  
Whether that reference was a drafting mistake or a political compromise, it now 
leaves an important ambiguity to be resolved by judicial and administrative 
interpretation.  Finally, A.B.5 has no impact on an individual’s status as an 
employee for tort purposes and has an uneven impact in the tax context.  This 
leads to the possibility that an individual will be classified differently under 
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A.B.5’s ABC test than she will be classified for tax or tort purposes under the 
common law control test. 
V.  GOING FORWARD FROM A.B.5: MUDDLING THROUGH THE TRADE-OFF 
A.B.5 represents a significant, but limited, extension of employment-based 
protection to certain California workers.  However, A.B.5 does not make the law 
of employee status clearer, simpler, or more uniform.  Indeed, A.B.5 makes the 
law more complex and less uniform than it was before.  In this final section, I 
argue that the policy considerations and political realities that led to this outcome 
in California will recur in other states and in Congress.  “Muddling through” in 
this area is inevitable and is the best the law can do. 
Consider the many exceptions of A.B.5.  These may be understood as political 
accommodations for particular industries, which, by means of such exceptions, 
avoid the ABC test for their respective employees.  These exceptions may also 
be understood in policy terms as fine-tuning employee status in light of 
compelling, industry-specific concerns.  Both explanations may contain part of 
the truth.  These political realities and policy considerations, which molded the 
extensive exceptions of A.B.5, will recur in other states and in Congress.  Thus, 
in those other states and on Capitol Hill, the outcomes will be similar to the 
results in California: broadened labor protection purchased at the cost of more 
complexity and less uniformity in the definition of who is an employee. 
Consider in this context A.B.5’s exceptions from the ABC test for lawyers, 
architects, engineers, and accountants.242  Those exceptions are straightforward: 
all workers in these professions are automatically exempted from the ABC test 
and are instead subject to the Borello standard for employee status.243  These 
exceptions may reflect the political heft of the firms and individuals that practice 
these professions.  These firms may prefer to denominate as independent 
contractors some of the professionals with whom they engage.  Such firms’ 
political voices might have been significant in the legislative process resulting 
in the adoption of A.B.5. 
There is as well a policy rationale for A.B.5 extending less employment-based 
protection to the members of these professions.  Lawyers, engineers, architects, 
and accountants may be deemed, by virtue of their educations and professional 
statuses, to have greater bargaining power in the marketplace than do other, less 
advantaged service providers.  Because these professionals have greater ability 
to protect themselves, the argument would go, they have less need of statutory 
succor.  Whether the political or the policy-based explanation is correct—and 
they may both be—the same political realities and policy concerns that molded 
A.B.5 will also influence legislative outcomes in other states and in Congress. 
                                                 
 242. Cal. Assemb. B. 5 § 2 (adding § 2750.3(b)(3) to the California Labor Code). 
 243. As observed previously, this statutory reference leaves unclear which version of the 
Borello test applies.  See discussion supra Section IV.D. 
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Contrast A.B.5’s straightforward exceptions from the ABC test for lawyers, 
accountants, engineers, and architects with that statute’s narrower, more detailed 
exceptions for manicurists, barbers, and cosmetologists.244  These service 
providers are excepted from the ABC test, and thus governed by Borello only if 
they can prove that they meet detailed standards including that the service 
provider maintain a “separate” “business location,”245 “holds [herself] out to 
other potential customers as available to perform the same type of work[,]”246 
and “has the ability to set [her] own hours” of work247 and rate of 
compensation.248 
Both a political narrative and a policy saga may explain why A.B.5 gives these 
service providers a more qualified exemption from the ABC test than that 
legislation affords to lawyers, accountants, engineers, and architects.  In political 
terms, manicure, barber, and cosmetology businesses may have had less 
lobbying weight in Sacramento than law, accounting, engineering, and 
architectural firms.  Thus, businesses engaging manicurists, barbers, and 
cosmetologists achieved for themselves less relief from the burdens of the ABC 
test.  From a policy perspective, manicurists, barbers, and cosmetologists may 
be perceived as having less bargaining power in the marketplace, and thus be in 
greater need of legislative protection.  Hence, the California legislature removed 
these workers from the protection of the ABC test under more limited 
circumstances.  Both explanations may entail part of the story.  In any event, the 
outcome is more complexity and less uniformity in the definition of who is an 
employee. 
The trade-off reflected in A.B.5—more labor law protection for some workers 
purchased at the price of greater complexity and less uniformity in the legal 
definition of who is an employee—will occur in other states and in Congress if 
and when they consider similar legislation to address the definition of who is an 
employee.  The same political forces and policy considerations that framed 
A.B.5 will also be at work in those states and in Congress, resulting in similar 
legislative choices and compromises. 
There is, moreover, a compelling policy argument against uniformity in the 
definition of an employee.  The concept of “employee” plays diverse roles in 
different legal settings.  In the tax context, the category of “employee” 
determines whether a payer or the corresponding payee is the proper party on 
which to place withholding obligations and whether certain benefits extend to 
taxpayers denominated for tax purposes as “employees.”  In the tort setting, the 
concept of “employee” identifies if there is a person to whom liability should be 
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extended under the doctrine of respondeat superior.  In the regulatory context, 
the term “employee” determines whether protective legislation should or should 
not govern a person’s economic relationships.  Given this diversity of 
purposes,249 it may be sensible that some individuals are deemed to be 
employees in one of these contexts but not in another. 
Judge Frank observed tongue-in-cheek that, because the term “gift” has varied 
meaning in different tax contexts, the law should distinguish “gift[s]” from 
“gaft[s]” and “geft[s].”250  Judge Frank’s observation illuminates the choices the 
law confronts when defining the term “employee.”  There is important overlap, 
but there are also important differences in the purpose of the term “employee” 
in varied contexts.  If we were starting from scratch today, we might use different 
terms in each of these various settings to describe the relevant relationships.  But 
we are not starting from scratch. 
Despite the strong scholarly emphasis on the need to simplify and unify the 
definition of employee status,251 the prospect of greater uniformity and greater 
simplicity in this area is a chimera.  Given the different roles that the term 
“employee” serves in different legal settings such as taxes, torts, and regulatory 
protection, one size does not easily fit all when defining who is an employee.  
The employee/independent contractor dichotomy reflects a deeply held 
intuition, which, despite its foundational status, can be implemented in the 
modern world only with great and detailed difficulty.  A “hodgepodge”252 in this 
area is the best the law can do, given how much work we now expect the concept 
of “employee” to do. 
A.B.5 emerged from the legislative process in the bluest of blue states.  It is 
hard to imagine that in other states, employer interests will have less influence 
than they apparently had in California as A.B.5 was written.  Legislation 
emulating A.B.5 in other states and in Congress may well have more, rather than 
fewer, industry-driven exceptions than those embedded in A.B.5. 
Others might point to the difficulties manifested in A.B.5 and suggest that the 
distinction between employees and independent contractors has outlived its 
usefulness.  Perhaps, for example, the time has come to impose tax withholding 
obligations to include payments to persons today classified as independent 
contractors.  Similarly, from this vantage, protections against discrimination 
now only applicable in the employment-based workplace should extend to a 
broader set of economic transactions and relationships. 
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Those favoring this future can cite as a model New York City’s recent—and 
controversial—regulation of the ride-sharing industry.253  The N.Y.C. Taxi and 
Limousine Commission (TLC) did not decide whether Uber and Lyft drivers 
should be classified as drivers.  Instead, it imposed regulations on the ride-
sharing industry without engaging in that debate.  For those skeptical of the 
continuing utility of the distinction between employees and independent 
contractors, these TLC regulations are a harbinger of a future legal system, 
which scraps that distinction or, at least, reduces its role. 
Another possible harbinger of a future in which the concept of “employee” 
plays a reduced role is Congress’s decision in response to the COVID-19 crisis 
to permit states to extend unemployment compensation to independent 
contractors.254 
A final observation: A.B.5 leaves me skeptical of proposals for a third 
category such as “dependent contractors”255 or “independent workers[.]”256  
These categories will not obviate the need for or the inevitability of the kinds of 
choices reflected in A.B.5.  It is difficult to see how the use of these labels would 
have made A.B.5 better while these labels would have introduced yet more 
complexity into the law.  More complexity makes the law more difficult to 
enforce and more manipulable by those seeking to avoid compliance. 
Two generations ago, Professor Charles E. Lindblom famously catalogued the 
benefits of “muddling through.”257  Some problems do not lend themselves to 
neat and comprehensive solutions.  A.B.5 confirms that the legal definition of 
employment is one of these.  In many respects, it would be attractive if the legal 
definition of who is an employee could be simplified and be made more uniform, 
as many commentators urge.  But, as A.B.5 demonstrates, this is not in the cards 
nor should it be, given the various functions that employee status plays in 
different areas of the law and the contending policy and political pressures 
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molding the law in this area.  Whatever the merits of A.B.5 might be, uniformity, 
simplicity, and certainty are not among these. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
A.B.5 is an important data point in the debate about defining who is an 
employee in the modern economy.  A.B.5 made a significant but limited 
expansion of the coverage of California labor law, but at a notable cost.  Even 
as A.B.5 broadened the reach of the Golden State’s labor protections, A.B.5 
made the definition of “employee” more complex and less uniform.  Those 
seeking federal or state legislation like A.B.5 will confront the same trade-off 
under which greater coverage is achieved at the expense of more complexity and 
less uniformity in the definition of who is an employee.  The same political 
forces and policy considerations, which molded A.B.5 in California, will have 
similar effects in other states and in the halls of Congress. 
For those who contend that the current law of employee status is too complex 
and uncertain, A.B.5 makes matters worse.  A.B.5 is replete with exceptions, 
exemptions, and interpretive challenges that make the law of employee status 
even more complicated and unclear.  For those who seek expanded, 
employment-based protection for workers in the modern economy, A.B.5 is an 
important but limited victory.  For these advocates of expanded employment-
based protection, the myriad exceptions and exemptions of A.B.5 are a sober 
warning of the practical and political realities standing in the way of such 
expanded protection.  For those defending the status quo, A.B.5 should be an 
equally sober warning of considerable dissatisfaction with this status quo. 
In sum, the narrative of A.B.5 indicates that, given the political realities and 
policy considerations, legislators can broaden the reach of employment-based 
regulatory laws to cover more workers in the modern economy, or they can 
simplify and unify the legal definition of employee status.  They cannot do both. 
